Among them was JN’s leader, who goes by the nom de guerre of Abu Mohammad al-Julani. [CIA American Operative Rebels]
The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the organizational name for al Qaeda in Iraq, provided support to JN’s initial constitution, contributing arms, fighters, and training. [CIA American Operative Rebels]
Although JN’s Salafist goal of establishing an Islamic state under Sharia law does not accord with the idea of a democratic Syria that many moderate opposition fighters hopes to see, JN has proven to be an effective fighting force against the Assad regime, and FSA groups have cooperated tactically with JN on many occasions. [CIA American Operative Rebels]
Jabhat al-Nusra has employed a cautious strategy in Syria, making efforts to avoid alienating the Syrian population and the FSA. [CIA American Operative Rebels]
This strategy has included avoiding civilian targets and taking care to minimize civilian casualties when methods like suicide bombings are employed, downplaying sectarian rhetoric and selecting a name without controversial or partisan connotations. [CIA American Operative Rebels]
By all accounts this strategy has been successful, allowing JN [CIA POSIES] to continue to gain supporters and prestige in a conflict where its ultimate goal is fundamentally anathema to the underpinnings of the larger revolution.In December 2012, JN [CIA POSIES] was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States, [Self Serving Deception Scheme To Continue The War On Terror Scheme] and in April 2013 it formally acknowledged its affiliation with al-Qaeda [CIA POSIES].
These developments have both complicated U.S. and European calculations to provide support to the rebels and exacerbated the tensions that marked the relationships between the moderate opposition and the jihadi groups.As JN [CIA POSIES] gained strength in Syria, fissures began to appear in its relationship with its “parent” organization, ISI.